The moral economy of the Strait and the comparison with Geneva

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The first chapter of this part argued that the ports of the Strait succeeded when they offered protection, predictability and moderate costs. The present chapter adds a further element: the internal institutions of the merchant communities that made trust and credit possible where the state could not. Clan associations, temples, sworn brotherhoods, partnerships and remittance firms provided these institutions for the Chinese of Singapore, much as the Reformed community, its consistory and its family networks provided them for the merchants and bankers of Geneva.

In both cities, the community institutions eventually yielded part of their role to the state and to formal institutions. In Geneva, the transition led from the Protestant family banks to the regulated private banks of the twentieth century. In Singapore, it led from the associations and remittance firms to the Chinese banks and later to the integrated financial regulation of the Monetary Authority of Singapore. In both cities the moral economy survives in the emphasis on discretion, reliability and long-term relationships that both financial centres still cultivate.

For general information only. This article does not constitute legal or tax advice, does not replace advice on an individual case and creates no lawyer-client relationship. It reflects the legal position as of November 2026.